Stalemate and Dead Conscripts in the Age of Drones
Horrifying reality of the war Starmer & Co have planned for conscripts
| By Nick Griffin Oct 2025 Follow Nick on X Follow Nick on Substack |
 |
They’re coming for your sons - and perhaps daughters as well. Whenever Starmer, Lammy or their Tory counterparts talk about future war with Russia, they really mean “conscription” for British youth, as well as even higher taxes for the rest of us.
What would face the conscripts? A couple of month training to fight a 20th century war (see my piece on the Channel 5 documentary/recruitment advert series ‘Soldier - for King and Country) and then dispatch to the front line in Eastern Europe (no retreat to Dunkirk and rescue for them).
What will they find there? This post from a podcast by
gives us a horrifying insight.
Frontline realities of 2025 Small squads are fighting a huge war. A “strongpoint” can be held by a handful — two, three, or four people. The line of contact (LOC) has been completely transformed. In 2023 our mission was to get a company into a village with ten BMP-3s. That was already difficult back then.
Now the vehicles sit tens of kilometers from the LOC. If in 2023 those same BMP-3s could play the role of little tanks, today they’re unlikely to reach a firing position. Not because the vehicles are “obsolete” — it’s that, for whatever reason, they can’t be systematically protected or covered from the main threat: kamikaze drones.
Here’s what “getting there” looks like for a regular infantryman. It’s a full march now. With all your kit — roughly 30 kilos — you get dropped 10–15 kilometers from the point where you will actually fight. Some approaches run up to 30 kilometers. Other routes, under forest cover, let you leap to within a few kilometers of the LOC.
Beyond that, resupply and movement rely on ATVs, dirt bikes, and whatever sort of sketchy electric scooters people are improvising. The rear area now begins some 50 kilometers from the LOC.
The hardest part is getting there. Routes and lines of communication are being mined — via drones. Improvised mines and booby traps are shoved into medkits, casings are smeared with glue and covered with grass, scores of small bomblets are scattered on trails, and where you can see a wheel track there are large magnetic mines. If you don’t know how all these mines look, you will step on one.
The route is the single most dangerous segment. Small Mavics constantly watch movement and can instantly pass coordinates to an FPV strike team or an artillery battery. On the LOC itself — in a dugout — it can be less dangerous than on the way to it. The common pattern now: guys sit holed up for a month or two and pull through with no losses, then get into trouble on the exit.
There is no organized mechanized resupply. Everything moves on foot. The best you can hope for is a gutsy motorcyclist who’ll dash in and get out. At night the nastiness wakes up. Large drones with thermal sensors drop mortar rounds. If you haven’t found your fighting position before sunset — you die.
That leads to the core problem. You can’t amass forces or sustain large numbers on the LOC anymore. That’s true for both sides. To fix this and start winning systematically you need unit-authorized ATVs, large logistics drones, small evacuation buggies, and drone interceptors. Right now all of those are off the books — bought privately or cobbled together through aid channels.
Micro-teams must do everything. There are no dedicated combat engineers, signalers, or medics in many units. You have to know it all yourself. First — navigation and working with mobile maps; second — radio and signal procedures; third — explosive ordnance recognition and basic EOD tradecraft. Without those skills you’ll get physically lost, lose contact with those who could help, and step on a little woolly thing in no-man’s land that will end you.
The gray zone is now about 2–3 kilometers. In that “no-man’s territory” there’s nothing but abandoned 200s and mines. It’s crushing for fighters’ morale. The enemy will often break and run after taking their first losses during an assault. The quality of their troops — you can see the forced draft and degradation for yourself. Even their special units have lost their old edge. Still, the bottom line is we can barely reach them.
So there you have it. Not just the answer to the question of why the obviously massively superior Russian army can’t smash through its poor, brave, outgunned surviving opponents. But, far more important to the average Brit - the reality of the bloody and obscene conflict into which the Westminster and media elite are so desperate to drag us.
If it was a war to repel an invasion of Britain (as if….) then we would just have to put up with it. If the war in Ukraine had any connection to vital British interests, we should have a national debate as to whether to get involved.
But it is not. It is a border quarrel between two other countries which has nothing to do with us - unless you count the fact that Boris Johnson intervened to scupper the peace deal which would have stopped it.
Quite apart from the personal tragedies when families when young lives are thrown away for nothing, this country - as I’ve explained in my Substack articles on the Demographic Winter - simply doesn’t have young men to spare. Those who would send the few we do have to miserable deaths in an unnecessary, unwinnable war are not merely fools, but a menace to us all.
“No to Conscription. No British blood for Ukraine. Britons fight for Britain only!”
Thanks for reading Nick Griffin Beyond the Pale! The only political figure on the ‘right’ of British politics willing to speak out without compromise or apology against the warmongers. Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.
Nick Griffin Beyond the Pale is free today. But if you enjoyed this post, you can tell Nick Griffin Beyond the Pale that their writing is valuable by pledging a future subscription. You won't be charged unless they enable payments.
|
